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Ways to use the modal logic playground
Ways to use the modal logic playground













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#WAYS TO USE THE MODAL LOGIC PLAYGROUND VERIFICATION#

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ways to use the modal logic playground

We use these notions to express what knowledge a person must have in order to perform a given action and what knowledge a person acquires by carrying out a given action. We integrate this theory with a logic of actions by identifying possible worlds with the situations before and after an action is performed. This means that we reason not about what facts someone knows, but rather what possible worlds are compatible with what he knows. We solve this problem by taking the possible-world semantics for a modal logic of knowledge and axiomatizing it directly in first-order logic. There are, however, no known techniques for efficiently doing automatic deduction directly in modal logics.

ways to use the modal logic playground

The first problem we face in achieving this goal is that the basic facts about knowledge we need to use are most naturally expressed as a modal logic. In particular, we want to be able to reason about what knowledge a person must have in order to perform an action, and what knowledge a person may gain by performing an action. This report deals with the problem of making a computer reason about the interactions between knowledge and action.













Ways to use the modal logic playground